University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2011

Constitutionalism in the United Kingdom
W.J. Waluchow

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Waluchow, W.J., "Constitutionalism in the United Kingdom" (2011). Constitutional Commentary. 1118.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1118

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

!!WALUCHOW-272-KAVANAGHREVIEW3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

10/17/2011 9:46 AM

Book Review
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT. Aileen Kavanagh.1 Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press. 2009. Pp. xiii + 455. $139.00 (Cloth),
$61.99 (Paperback).
2

W.J. Waluchow

In 1998, the United Kingdom (“UK”) experienced what
could plausibly be characterized as a constitutional revolution,
which was described by British constitutional lawyer, Keith
Ewing, as “the most significant formal redistribution of political
3
power in this country since 1911, and perhaps since 1688.”
Under the newly introduced Human Rights Act (“HRA”),
courts in the UK were, for the first time, explicitly empowered to
review UK legislation against a codified set of rights, namely
those found in the European Convention of Human Rights
(“ECHR”). This is an international treaty to which the UK, as a
member of the Council of Europe, had long been a signatory.
Before 1998, the only form of redress for UK citizens, concerned
with what they claimed to be violation of their Convention rights
by UK government bodies was appeal to the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg. This is a body whose judgments,
though given some (variable) measure of respect by the official
organs of the UK government and judiciary, were not considered
binding under UK law. The relationship between Strasbourg and
these UK domestic bodies was anything but clear, comfortable,

1. Reader in Law, University of Leicester.
2. Senator William McMaster Chair in Constitutional Studies, Department of
Philosophy, McMaster University.
3. P. 1 (quoting Keith Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary
Democracy, 62 MOD. L. REV. 79, 79 (1999)).
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or stable. But by incorporating the Convention directly into UK
law, all that changed. Citizens were able to appeal directly to UK
courts for judgments concerning the compatibility of domestic
UK laws with the rights (of the ECHR) now codified in the
HRA.
Those whose thoughts about the nature and justification of
judicial review (or what Aileen Kavanagh prefers to call
“constitutional review”) have been shaped by exposure to the
relatively strong form(s) it takes under an entrenched,
constitutional document like the United States Bill of Rights
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms with it’s Section 33 “notwithstanding” or
“override” clause, may be surprised to discover an absence, in
the UK, of many familiar features. Two differences stand out:
(a) the HRA is, strictly speaking, an ordinary act of Parliament
and, as such, is subject to ordinary procedures of repeal and
amendment; and (b) UK judges do not enjoy the more familiar
authority of American and Canadian judges to “strike down”
laws judged to be in violation of recognized rights. Instead, they
are required to take one of the following two steps. First, in cases
where legislation, as it would normally be interpreted, is judged
to infringe Convention rights, UK judges are required, under
Section 3 of the HRA, to provide an authoritative interpretation
of the otherwise offending legislation that renders it compatible
with Convention rights. Often this interpretation will be one
which departs from the plain, ordinary meaning of the
legislation, or from the intended meaning plausibly ascribed to
its drafters. In other words, judges are required to provide an
authoritative interpretation which, but for the force of Section 3,
would almost certainly be condemned as forced and unnatural,
or an instance of judges trying to reinvent the law under the
guise of interpretation, thereby usurping a legislative role
properly reserved for democratically accountable bodies like
Parliament. When all efforts to provide an appropriate
interpretation fail, Section 4 of the HRA requires UK judges to
issue a “declaration of incompatibility,” a public statement of
how and why the provisions in question cannot be rendered
compatible with the relevant Convention right(s). It is then up to
the offending body—or more precisely, the body judged by the
court to have offended the HRA—to take whatever remedial
steps, if any, it deems appropriate. Strictly speaking, then, a
declaration of incompatibility fails to disturb the legal status quo.
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These features of the HRA may lead one to think that the
monumental step described by Ewing was not really much of a
step at all. One of Kavanagh’s objectives in this splendid book is
to disabuse us of this idea, while at the same time assuaging the
concerns of those who fear that the HRA marks a far too
dramatic departure from centuries-long UK constitutional
history, in particular its long-time commitment to the principles
of Parliamentary sovereignty and democracy. Kavanagh
skillfully surveys the relevant case law and the official (and nonofficial) records of public, judicial and parliamentary debates
surrounding adoption, implementation and application of the
HRA. Kavanagh also succeeds in demonstrating that
constitutional practice under the HRA is not as far removed
from what one finds in Canada and the United States as might
appear, at first glance. It is certainly not as far removed as would
be suggested by a superficial understanding of the two features
described above. But these changes are not so dramatic as to
represent the complete abandonment of centuries-long
parliamentary and democratic traditions either. Kavanagh sets
out to demonstrate that the traditional, orthodox doctrine of
Parliamentary sovereignty is an exaggeration, and that the
strong interpretive powers granted under Section 3 of the HRA
are not qualitatively different from the powers judges have long
enjoyed under common law.
So why is all this the case? Consider each of the two
features mentioned above, beginning with the fact that the HRA
is an ordinary Act of Parliament, and therefore as formally
subject to amendment and repeal as the most mundane of tax
laws. As Kavanagh ably shows, the HRA is, in reality, nothing
close to an ordinary statute. Given factors like the subject matter
of the HRA (human rights), the fact that it incorporates
Convention rights, which the UK has long been bound to
observe as a matter of international treaty, and the world-wide
trend towards the constitutionalisation of human rights coupled
with fairly robust forms of constitutional review, it would be well
nigh impossible for the UK Parliament to turn around and
repeal or substantially amend the HRA. Tony Blair “once
suggested that he would consider seeking to amend the HRA if
it proved to be an obstacle to the ‘war on terror’” (p. 7 n. 37),
but, Kavanagh intimates, such a move would have been political
suicide. Once a nation has taken the monumental step of
codifying a set of human rights and placing in the hands of its
courts the responsibility of overseeing and judging government
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action against the standard it sets, it is very difficult to turn back.
It is hard to imagine a government, whose continued existence
and effectiveness depend on sustained public support from the
electorate and the other official branches of the state, in effect
declaring its opposition to human rights by repealing the HRA,
or seriously diluting it by way of amendment. So even if there is
nothing in black letter constitutional law to prevent either of
these moves, political reality serves as a virtually insurmountable
check on the exercise of the relevant legal power. For all intents
and purposes, the HRA is as entrenched a part of the UK
constitution as the Bill of Rights is of the United States
Constitution. Only a very narrow, formalistic view of
constitutions that sees their identity and content as exhausted by
the formal terms of entrenched, judicially enforceable
documents, would deny this constitutional reality.
Turning now to the second notable feature of the HRA—
that it does not provide for the legal power to strike down
legislation—we once again see Kavanagh demonstrating that
appearances are deceiving. The burden of her argument is to
show, via an extensive review of both pre- and post-HRA case
law and practice, that the powers of review granted by the HRA
are not only fully justifiable as integral parts of a democratically
legitimate system of government, they are also not substantially
different from powers which UK judges have exercised for
centuries. Take Section 3 again, for example. According to
Kavanagh,
we should first bear in mind that section 3(1) does not give
the courts radically new methods of interpretation which they
did not possess pre-HRA. Judges have always possessed (and
exercised) the power to rectify statutory language, if to do so
would remove an injustice or violate a fundamental
constitutional principle. . . . The law reports are full of (preHRA) cases where the courts supplied ‘the omission of the
legislature’ to protect rights such as natural justice, or refused
to follow the clear implications of statutory terms where it
would deny a fundamental right or cause clear injustice. . . .
[T]he ability of the courts to depart from ordinary meaning
and to ‘read in’ and ‘read down’ in order to prevent a
violation of [constitutional] principles, was not one judges
received for the first time in 1998 (p. 115).

Section 4 of the HRA, as we have seen, requires judges to
issue a declaration of incompatibility should all efforts to find a
Convention-compatible reading of the relevant legislation end in
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failure. Such declarations have no immediate legal effect, either
for the party alleging a breach of his or her Convention rights, or
for the law judged to be incompatible. The law in question
retains its validity, together with its force and effect in the case at
hand. But once again, there is, according to Kavanagh, much
more than meets the eye. “[T]he immense political pressure to
comply with declarations of incompatibility is only part of the
picture. The rest of that picture is made up of legal pressures” (p.
321). Among these are the UK’s obligation, under international
law, to uphold Convention rights in their legal and political
practices, and the fact that the UK is subject to an adverse
finding of the Strasbourg Court that it stands in violation of
Convention rights if it fails to live up to this obligation. Yet
another factor is the status of a declaration as an authoritative (if
not formally binding) pronouncement of legal principle by the
nation’s highest courts. Few governments will wish to be publicly
tarred with the brush of violation in such circumstances. These
and other factors not only explain why deference to a court’s
declaration of incompatibility has been observed in every single
case since the HRA was adopted, it serves to explain the good
sense in saying that, in effect, the powers of UK judges under the
HRA are, in reality, virtually identical with the powers enjoyed
by their North American counterparts. “[A]s a judicial tool to
secure the protection of Convention rights in primary legislation,
the declaration of incompatibility is far from weak . . . . Apart
from its lack of direct remedial consequences for the individual
litigant, it is very similar, both in form and effect, to a judicial
‘strike-down’ power” (p. 417). In short, it functions as a
declaration of constitutional principle.
That one has the power to perform a particular action does
not, of course, always imply that one ought to do so, any more
than it follows from the fact that one has the right to speak in
some particular context that one ought to do so. Nowhere is this
truth more evident than in cases involving constitutional review.
In Part II of her book, Kavanagh sets out to investigate how UK
courts can carry out their duty to uphold Convention rights while
at the same time exercising an appropriate degree of
“deference” to the legislative branch. Courts and legislatures
often disagree about how best to understand or interpret a
particular human right provision. As a result, they often disagree
as well about whether a particular legislative Act, read in the
usual way, or in the way intended by those on whose initiative
the Act gained its existence, is consistent with that provision. Is a
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law authorizing UK government agents to subject suspected
terrorists to indefinite detention, without the usual safeguards
associated with natural justice and due process of law, an
unwarranted violation of the right to “a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law” (Convention, Article 6)? Any
government that enacts such a law presumably does not think so,
or it would not have enacted the law in the form it took. But
judges often disagree, leaving them with the unenviable task of
deciding how best to respond. Should they declare an
incompatibility with all the attendant effects discussed above?
Should they instead provide an otherwise unnatural or forced
reading of the legislation, one that avoids an inconsistency with
the human right provision—understood as the judges understand
it—but does so only at the cost of seriously hindering, if not
outright thwarting, the government’s objectives? Or should they
do nothing? The easy route is simply to say this: Judges should
take whatever steps they deem necessary to enforce the relevant
human rights, as they understand them. This, after all, is what
they are charged with doing when they are given the power of
constitutional review under the HRA. A strength of Kavanagh’s
analysis and defense of constitutional review under that Act is
that she does not take this easy route. Instead, Kavanagh
explores the nature of deference and provides a sophisticated
analysis of how best to balance the demands of judicial
supervision against the demands of judicial deference in a
constitutional democracy. Drawing on an extensive analysis of
the relevant case law, Kavanagh defends “a variable and
contextual approach to determining the constitutionally
appropriate degree of deference in a particular case” (p. 201).
This approach “firmly rejects the idea that substantial judicial
deference should be given the elected branches [of government]
in a routine or blanket fashion” (p. 201). This approach also
rejects outright any attempt to carve out, ab initio, certain
subject areas as ones in which particular degrees of deference
are either warranted or inappropriate. Whether and to what
degree judges should defer to legislative decisions must be
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a range
of different institutional and epistemic considerations bearing on
the case at hand. These include: (a) the role of the judiciary as a
secondary decision-maker charged not with the duty to make
primary decisions based on an assessment of the reasons for and
against an act of government, but with the secondary
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responsibility to vet the primary decisions of others for
conformity with constitutional constraints; and (b) the degree of
uncertainty attached to the particular question at issue. As she
sees it, “deference is a rational response to uncertainty”;
“judicial deference and uncertainty have an inverse relationship:
the more certainty, the less deference and vice versa” (p. 171).
Further relevant factors include: (c) the competence and
expertise of the legislature compared with the judiciary to decide
on the matter in question. “When a case concerns an issue which
would require widespread or radical reform of various
interlinked areas of the law, a responsible judge will sometimes
pay substantial deference to the superior law-making
competence of Parliament” (p. 182); and finally (d) the superior
resources, capacity, and, hence, democratic legitimacy, of the
elected branches of government “to ensure that there is an
acceptable reconciliation of competing social interests, when a
matter is highly controversial” (p. 194). There is no easy formula
to apply here. Each case must be assessed on its own terms, with
full sensitivity to all the relevant factors.
This analysis strikes me as an eminently sensible one,
particularly in its recognition that there are no easy cookiecutter solutions to issues of deference. If I had one small
quibble—and it is a small one—it would be that Kavanagh’s
analysis, with its otherwise laudable emphasis on case-by-case
assessment, may underplay the relevance of the fact that what is
at issue here are human rights. These seem qualitatively different
from most, if not all, of the other social interests at play in cases
involving the issue of deference. This is not to say that Kavanagh
is unaware of the importance of this qualitative difference. After
all, it is no doubt included under factor (c) above, the respective
competencies of courts and legislatures to decide on the issue at
hand, a matter she spends a considerable amount of time
discussing at various points in her book. But the vital importance
of human rights, and the standing temptations of governments to
give them short shrift in exigent times, may warrant our treating
these interests as special. Perhaps here the appropriate degree of
judicial deference should be governed by fixed rules.
In the third and final part of her book, Kavanagh sets out to
“tackle the big constitutional questions” (p. 8). These include the
HRA’s compatibility, in theory, with the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, as well as the array of underlying
normative questions about the very justification of constitutional
review in a democracy. Concerning the compatibility of the
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HRA with parliamentary sovereignty, Kavanagh is at pains to
stress several crucial points. Dicey notwithstanding, it is no
longer (if it ever was) true that “Parliament . . . has, under the
English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised . . .
as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of
4
Parliament.” According the Kavanagh, “the orthodox principle
of parliamentary sovereignty as stated by Dicey has very little
explanatory force” (p. 316). It neither provides an accurate
descriptive account of British constitutional practice, nor
manages to explain and illuminate key features of that practice.
Not only is Parliament subject to significant political constraints
on its power to act as it pleases, the orthodox principle also “fails
to account for the considerable legal limitations on the power of
Parliament to enact laws, most obviously, those which arise from
the UK’s membership of the European Union” (p. 317). Union
membership places the UK under the duty to recognize the
superior status of EU law. Along with this comes the “necessary
corollary that if an Act of Parliament comes into conflict with
EU law, the former will be ‘disapplied’” (p. 317). Yet another
feature of British constitutional practice that counts against the
orthodox view is one discussed above—the considerable
interpretive powers UK judges have long enjoyed. “One of the
underlying themes of [Kavanagh’s] book [is] that through the
traditional doctrines of statutory interpretation, the courts have
always constrained Parliament’s ability to enact legislation which
violates fundamental constitutional rights” (p. 328, emphasis
added). So if it was once true that the powers of Parliament were
as unbridled as Dicey suggests, it seems pretty clear that this has
not been true for some time now.
This brings us to the final, and perhaps most theoretical
chapters of Kavanagh’s book, where she tackles an array of
philosophical criticisms of constitutional review in a democracy.
Most of the arguments are familiar. First, judges are not Platonic
kings and queens with pipelines to the truth about political
morality, including those parts which deal with human rights, so
why should they, as opposed to legislators, be assigned the task
of discerning the truth about human rights? Second, leaving
questions of fundamental human rights to be determined by
judges in their chambers reduces the level of public discourse

4. P. 314 (quoting ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 39-40 (10th ed., 1959)).
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and debate on these important issues of political morality and,
therefore, hinders their recognition and enforcement. Third,
judges lack the informational resources enjoyed by legislative
bodies, and are therefore in a very poor position to perform the
delicate balancing required to reconcile human rights with the
many other pressing social interests at stake in typical human
rights cases. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
constitutional review robs ordinary citizens (and their elected
representatives) of their right to participate fully in communal
decision-making about fundamental matters of political
morality, including the nature and proper limits of fundamental
human rights. In short, constitutional review is fundamentally at
odds with democracy.
In addressing these and other concerns, Kavanagh marshals
an array of arguments with which readers of her work will also
be well familiar. According to Kavanagh, constitutional review
under the HRA is not a substitute for legislative decision-making
on a particular set of political questions. On the contrary,
Parliament retains its role as the primary decision-maker, while
judges are restricted to a much narrower, different set of
questions concerning the compatibility of Parliament’s activities
with Convention rights authoritatively adopted by the
democratically accountable branches of governments. In short,
constitutional review does not involve the Courts asking the very
same sets of questions as the more overtly political branches and
substituting their answers for those of their more democratically
accountable counterparts.
[The courts] are . . . partners in a constitutional collaboration,
who are charged with the (often creative) task of furthering,
determining,
applying
and
sometimes
modifying
[Parliament’s] will in order to achieve a Conventioncompatible result. In terms of its constitutional position as the
primary law-maker, Parliament is undoubtedly the senior
partner. It has the power to make law on any subject, at any
time, and virtually for any reason (p. 407).

A system of government in which unelected judges have the
power to modify, and, in some cases, thwart the will of
Parliament in the ways sanctioned by the HRA is, Kavanagh is
prepared to concede, inherently undemocratic. She is not, she
says, prepared to endorse what Ronald Dworkin calls the
“constitutional” conception of democracy, according to which a
system of government is democratic not merely because and
insofar as it encompasses recognized forms of democratic
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procedure (e.g., one person one vote) that are “responsive, in
some meaningful way to popular opinion and input,” but
because it manages, in one way or another, to protect the equal
moral status of all members of the relevant community. On the
contrary, Kavanagh argues that democracy and justice represent
two different values, and constitutional review is always
purchased at “a democratic cost” (p. 368). But it is a cost well
worth paying for the sake of justice to the individual. This is not
its only advantage, however. Drawing on familiar arguments that
unbridled democratic procedures tend to marginalize the
interests of entrenched minorities, Kavanagh further argues that
judicial review affords disadvantaged groups and individuals an
additional—and in some cases, the only—source of access to the
levers of political power. It thereby helps promote equal effective
participation in political decision-making.
[T]he existence of an independent tribunal to review and
assess the Convention-compatibility of legislation is valuable,
because it enables those groups at least to get their case heard
in a forum which is relatively independent of the political
power structures which may otherwise prevent them from
getting to protection of their rights” (p. 378). Without
constitutional review, “the idea that genuinely equal
participation can be achieved simply by giving everyone the
right to participate is no more than a ‘pious aspiration’ (p.
378).

In short, the interests underlying the democratic right to
participate in political decision-making “(namely, autonomy,
dignity, inclusion, etc.) are better protected by having
democratic government combined with constitutional review”
(p. 379). If this is so, and I believe it is, one wonders why
Kavanagh so readily concedes that constitutional review is
inherently undemocratic. If, absent constitutional review, many
are left with ineffective representation, how can constitutional
review be inherently undemocratic? One would have thought
that, in helping to secure effective participation, it thereby
enhances the realization of a properly functioning democracy. In
other words, without constitutional review, the realization of
democratic values remains, in most societies, “a pious
aspiration.”
In this review, I have managed only to touch upon the
wealth of legal analysis, historical scholarship, and philosophical
argument contained within Kavanagh’s impressive book. Suffice
to say that those who would like to learn something—or a bit
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more—about the status of constitutionalism outside North
American borders and who relish sophisticated, balanced
philosophical analysis informed by a thorough understanding of
the relevant legal practice would be well advised to read this
book.

